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ABSTRACT
The growing backlash against Big Tech companies is a symptom of digital
technology increasing the legibility of the world. New tools of sensing and
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computing have simplified the collection and analysis of information about
humanity and the world around us and made it more understandable. This
increased legibility is driving concerns about privacy, manipulation,
obsolescence, and misinformation.
How did governments adjust to past rapid increases in legibility? Yale
anthropologist James C. Scott’s book, Seeing Like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, explores this question
in depth and provides insights for how governments and companies should
respond today. 1
Scott argues that the success of the Industrial Revolution motivated a “high
modernism” mindset in government, with state leaders seeking to
fundamentally reshape and improve society. 2 To pursue such ambitious tasks
governments needed a society that was legible, often achieved by eliminating
important complexities and ignoring local knowledge. 3 Scott argues that when
“schemes to improve the human condition” include characteristics of imposed
legibility, a high-modernist mindset, strong central control, and weak social or
political constraints, they are doomed to fail, sometimes in horrific ways. 4
To avoid such outcomes, Scott’s work suggests four lessons for anyone who
would intervene in complex systems: (1) minimize simplistic legibility; (2)
temper ambitious plans with prudence and humility; (3) reduce the planner’s
ability to impose a plan; and (4) increase the ability of participants to resist or
shape such plans. 5
As governments and tech platforms seek to address the concerns driving the
“techlash,” these lessons provide guidance on how to avoid the worst pitfalls
that could adversely affect efforts to improve the human condition online. 6
INTRODUCTION
Big Tech platforms are facing a backlash of angry rhetoric and government
action. 7 Such companies handle enormous volumes of speech and
1
JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2 (Yale Univ. Press, 1998).
2
Id. at 4–5.
3
Id. at 6.
4
Id. at 4.
5
Id. at 4–5.
6
Robert D. Atkinson et al., A Policymaker’s Guide to ‘Techlash’—What It Is and Why
It’s a Threat to Growth and Progress, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://itif.org/publications/2019/10/28/policymakers-guide-techlash.
7
Clara Hendrickson & William A. Galston, Big Tech Threats: Making Sense of the
Backlash Against Online Platforms, BROOKINGS INST. (May 28, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/big-tech-threats-making-sense-of-the-backlash-against-
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communications for billions of people worldwide. 8 The systems they design
and the rules they set and enforce, therefore, have significant consequences for
individuals and the public. Just five years ago, media and political sentiment
for Big Tech was overwhelmingly positive and focused on the massive
benefits, realized and potential, that these companies could offer. 9 Today, that
sentiment has changed: These companies stand accused of a wide range of
problems, from invading privacy and causing addiction, to even enabling
election manipulation. 10 Regulators are investigating and suing these
companies, while legislators are proposing new laws targeting Big Tech. 11 This
“techlash,” perhaps most prominent in the United States and Europe, exists
around the world. 12
What concerns drive the “techlash” and what should platforms and
governments do to address them? In this paper I argue that the “techlash” is a
symptom of digital technology increasing the legibility of the world. New tools
of sensing and computing have simplified the collection and analysis of
information about us and the world around us. They have made the world more
readable.
Society previously experienced periods of rapid legibility increases. Today’s
tools of digital legibility continue a long tradition of tools that increase the
legibility of the world and thus our ability to understand and manipulate it. For
example, tools like the microscope or x-ray machine were revolutionary
because they accessed previously inaccessible information. 13 Scientists used
this new information to better understand the world. Doctors, inventors, and
engineers used it to solve practical problems. This applied understanding of the
world led to vast increases in progress and prosperity.
How did governments react to past increases in legibility? Yale
anthropologist James C. Scott’s book Seeing Like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed explores this question
online-platforms/.
8
The Myth of Social Media, GALLUP, https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/sac_report_11_socialmedia_061114.pdf (last visited May 5, 2021).
9
Bijan Stephen, How Black Lives Matters Uses Social Media to Fight the Power,
WIRED (Nov. 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses-socialmedia-to-fight-the-power/.
10 Casey Newton, New Legislation is Putting Social Networks in the Crosshairs, VERGE
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/1/20749517/social-network-legislationhawley-privacy-research.
11 Id.
12 Atkinson, supra note 6.
13 Laura Poppick, Let Us Now Praise the Invention of the Microscope, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-we-owe-tothe-invention-microscope-180962725/; Disruptive Technology 1890s-style: the Impact of
the X-ray, PHILIPS (Nov. 6, 2015), https://medium.com/@Philips/disruptive-technology1890s-style-the-impact-of-the-x-ray-3cc1c4e5ff0a.
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in depth and provides guidance for how governments and companies should
respond today. 14 Scott argues that the success of the Industrial Revolution—
which was driven by legibility-increasing scientific discoveries—motivated a
“high modernist” mindset. 15 This mindset tasked governments with
fundamentally reshaping and improving society. 16 To pursue such ambitious
tasks, governments needed society to be legible, and often imposed such
legibility—usually by eliminating important complexities and ignoring local
knowledge. 17
State-imposed legibility has unintended consequences. 18 Scott argues that
“schemes to improve the human condition” include characteristics of imposed
legibility, a high-modernist mindset, strong central control, and weak social or
political constraints, they are doomed to fail, sometimes in horrific ways. 19
To avoid such outcomes, his work suggests four lessons for those who
would intervene in complex systems: (1) minimize simplistic legibility; (2)
temper ambitious plans with prudence and humility; (3) reduce the planner’s
ability to impose a plan; and (4) increase the ability of participants to resist or
shape such plans. 20
In today’s world of increased and increasing legibility, governments and
tech platforms should heed these lessons. As governments and tech platforms
seek to address the concerns driving the techlash, these lessons provide
guidance on how to avoid the worst side effects and failures that can befall
schemes to improve the human condition online.
I. WHY SEEING LIKE A STATE?
In order to navigate this topic efficiently, I must provide a quick summary of
my roadmap: Yale Sterling Professor of Political Science James C. Scott’s
groundbreaking work, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve
the Human Condition Have Failed (“SLAS”). 21 Published in 1998, SLAS
describes how governments throughout history attempted to understand the
people and lands they governed. 22 It argues that the limits of this understanding
combined with other elements doomed many ambitious and often well-

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 4–6.
Id. at 4–5.
See generally id.
Id. at 1–2, 6.
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meaning government programs to catastrophic failure. 23
Scott identifies four characteristics common to the failed government efforts
that he studied. 24 First, government develops a simplified model of the
complex system it wants to change, increasing its legibility but losing
important knowledge. 25 Second, the project leadership has a “high modernism”
mindset that sets out ambitious plans for redesigning the system. 26 Third, the
leadership has sufficiently comprehensive authority to be able to mandate the
adoption of these plans. 27 And finally, the civil society involved is too weak to
overtly resist the imposition of the plans. 28
Why is Scott’s analysis of failed government programs a good guide for
understanding tech platform governance? I can think of at least three reasons.
First and most directly, SLAS explores the limits of what governments can
accomplish when regulating or even understanding complex systems. 29 Online
platforms and the internet more generally are highly complex systems. 30 Thus,
SLAS has insights for policy makers as they think about how to understand and
regulate in this space.
Second, SLAS has lessons for companies, too; many claim that the biggest
consumer-facing platforms, with billions of users, are similar to
governments. 31 This comparison has significant limits—the most important
being that these platforms lack a monopoly on legitimate force, meaning that
actual governments can still impose rules on them. 32 Still, platforms share the
third characteristic that Scott discusses: platforms have a lot of authority over
the systems they operate. 33 They possess a high degree of control over the
design of the applications and services they offer to users. 34 Indeed, their
technical ability to design the entirety of the user environment surpasses the
Id. at 4.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 5.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 2 (“In each case, officials took exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social
practices, such as land tenure customs or naming customs, and created a standard grid
whereby it could be centrally recorded and monitored.”).
30 Kihong Park, The Internet as a Complex System, PURDUE UNIV. (2005),
https://www.cs.purdue.edu/nsl/complex.pdf.
31 See Winston Hearn, Seeing Like a Tech Company, WINSTON THE THIRD (Aug. 12,
2020), https://www.winstonhearn.com/wrote/2020/seeing-like-a-tech-company/.
32 Id.; see also Chris Hoofnagle, Symposium, Seeing Like A Platform, BCLT/BTLJ
(Apr. 2019), https://hoofnagle.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/hoofnagle_bltj_
2019_seeing.pdf.
33 See Hearn, supra note 31 (noting that big tech platforms are like quasi-states in that
they are “wielding immense power, not simply over individuals, but also over the shape of
human culture at large.”).
34 Id.
23
24
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ability of even totalitarian governments to modify the physical or social
environment of their subjects. 35 Practically speaking, and in part because of the
lack of a monopoly of force, platforms face many constraints that authoritarian
governments do not: investor influence, user feedback, local laws, market
forces, etc. 36 Still, platforms’ high levels of control over their users’
environments means that platforms could benefit from SLAS’s lessons about
the challenges of executing ambitious plans over large populations. 37
The third reason SLAS applies to platforms is related to the second. SLAS is
not just a critical review of ambitious government projects. 38 At its core, SLAS
is about how such ambitious projects are facilitated or frustrated by
information, information collection, and limits to information collection. 39
SLAS focuses on government projects, but many tech companies’ projects rely
heavily on information collection. 40 SLAS’s lessons about the limits of
information collection apply to these companies’ strategies. 41
It is true that the consequences of the failures in SLAS are of a different
scale. Scott describes some of the most tragic humanitarian disasters of the last
century, caused by grand government projects, 42 whereas I am talking about
potential failures by creators of websites and mobile apps. Still, even if the
stakes are lower than preventing humanitarian disasters, they can still be high.
Mistakes in Facebook’s newsfeed decisions are unlikely to cause suffering on
the level of, say, Soviet forced relocation. But they are important to civil
discourse, news reporting, and our democracy. 43 So, I believe the lessons of

Id.
Id.
37 Issie Lapowsky, How Facebook’s Oversight Board Could Rewrite the Rules of the
Entire Internet, PROTOCOL (May 6, 2020), https://www.protocol.com/facebook-oversightboard-rules-of-the-internet.
38 Hearn, supra note 31 (noting that Scott’s book “is interested in these processes that
happen from the top down, states defining their goals and using power to force upon the
populace changes that are intended ‘for their benefit’ but ultimately fail and lead to great
human suffering. . . . I couldn’t help but see terrifying parallels to the modern tech
industry.”).
39 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2 (“I began to see legibility as a central problem in
statecraft.”).
40 See Aliza Vigderman & Gabe Turner, The Data Big Tech Companies Have on You,
SECURITY.ORG (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.security.org/resources/data-tech-companieshave/ (remarking on how much data companies have at their disposal from their services).
41 See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know
as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/
technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html (explaining how Facebook used
collected information that was provided to Cambridge Analytica and subsequently used to
potentially influence voters in the United States election of 2016).
42 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 3.
43 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
35
36
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SLAS remain relevant.
The remainder of the article will proceed as follows: first, the remainder of
this introduction describes what I (building on Scott) mean by legibility.
Section II explains how information technology is making the world more
legible. Section III lists and discusses four concerns motivated by this
increased legibility. Section IV distills from SLAS’s four lessons for
governance in this new environment. And Section V walks through an example
of applying those lessons to a technology policy question. Finally, Section VI
concludes.
II.

WHAT IS ‘LEGIBILITY’?

Because I will be using the term so much, it is worth digging into what I
mean by the word “legible.” 44 Like Scott, I mean approximately the dictionary
definition of legible: “capable of being read,” where “read” is interpreted very
broadly to mean “able to gather information from.” 45 For example, a
thermometer outside my kitchen window would make the outdoor temperature
legible to me. As the title of Scott’s book suggests, he focuses on what is
legible to the state. 46 I will apply the same term but more broadly consistent
with and even implied by Scott’s work.
A few relevant characteristics of legibility as Scott uses the term:
Legibility is subjective. Something that is perfectly legible to one can be
illegible to another. 47 For example, a village’s unique weights and measures,
used successfully every day by local farmers and merchants, might be useless
to central government administrators, unless they can convert it into familiar
units. 48 Language may be the prototypical example of a complex system that
can be perfectly legible to one person while incomprehensible to another. 49 In
the digital world, encryption can limit legibility to certain parties. But even
unencrypted information, such as session tracking cookies, might be available
to many parties but understandable to only a few. 50
Legibility can be imposed. Building on this idea of subjectivity, Scott
provides many examples of central authorities’ efforts to clarify, for their
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018).
44 See generally SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2.
45 Legible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (Feb. 11, 2021),
http://www.merriam-webster.com.
46 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2.
47 Id. at 24.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 72–73.
50 The Internet and Data Privacy: What Is Collected, How to Opt-Out of Cookies and
Disable Data Collection, SECURITY.ORG (July 16, 2020), https://www.security.org/digitalsafety/data-privacy/.
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purposes, matters that locals do not need clarified. 51 Such examples include
standardized weights and measures, mandatory surnames, property surveys and
population registers, scientific agriculture, and design of cities. 52 The internet
is protocol layer upon protocol layer of imposed legibility, although here the
better descriptor might be designed legibility; there was no pre-existing local
ordering replaced by, say, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol. 53
Imposed legibility has a purpose. When a state imposes legibility, it does
so in pursuit of a specific objective: easing tax collection; maximizing crops;
or streamlining military transportation. 54 Often states impose legibility to
assemble a summarized, synoptic view to guide interventions. 55 Scott describes
such efforts to make things “more legible—and hence manipulable—from
above and from the center.” 56
Legibility simplifies. Even though legibility can be imposed, when it is
imposed for a purpose it necessarily is a simplification that fails to fully
capture the local knowledge it summarizes. 57 Scott describes tools of legibility
as “rather like abridged maps [that] did not successfully represent the activity
of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to; they represented only
that slice of it that interested the official observer.” 58 Scott uses the term mētis
to describe one type of information discarded when states impose legibility on
a complex system. 59 This Greek word denotes knowledge that can only be
obtained from practical experience. 60 Simple examples include riding a bike or
sailing a boat. More complex examples include the “soft skills” of international
diplomacy or leading a company. 61 This type of knowledge is very specific to
an activity. Often, it is not even fully legible to the practitioner—they can’t
explain to another person precisely how to do what they have done. 62 Because
mētis is not fully legible even to those who possess it, it cannot be captured
when states seek to make a complex system legible. 63 And often, those
imposing legibility make the mistake of regarding mētis as useless noise or

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

See SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2.
See id. at 2.
Park, supra note 30, at 1.
SCOTT, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 3.
Id.

2021]

Seeing (Platforms) Like A State

39

disorder when it actually represents complexity. 64
Legibility and ambition feed each other. As Scott describes, instruments
of imposed legibility such as censuses, surveys, and population registers have
long been the basic tools of statecraft. 65 As the state gathers information, even
simplified information, it can more precisely and effectively deliver services
and pursue its mandates. 66 But as its mandates and purposes grow so too does
its need for information and thus its need for increased legibility. 67 In some
cases, when a state imposes legibility, it may disrupt a local community and
therefore increase the need for the centralized authority to intervene. 68
Scott focuses on state-imposed legibility, but there are other methods for
increasing legibility. Consider the microscope. Its invention opened a new
territory for exploration—it made legible a tiny, previously invisible domain. 69
Other legibility-increasing tools include the sundial, the metronome, the clock,
the compass, the scale, the barometer, the stethoscope, and the x-ray—and
more recently, the video camera and the microphone. 70 “Discovered” legibility
differs from imposed legibility because it does not change the observed system
(except, perhaps for observations at the quantum level). 71
This type of discovered legibility has been a major driver of scientific and
technical progress. 72 Once new tools of increased legibility make information
legible, people can apply logic and scientific methods to this newly legible
information to generate new hypothesis and theories and to solve practical
problems. 73
Scott does not expressly talk about this “discovered” legibility, but his work
documents how the increases in scientific legibility during the Industrial Age

Id. at 356–57.
Id. at 70–71.
66 Id. at 29.
67 Id. at 6.
68 Id. at 73.
69 See Liz Logan, Early Microscopes Revealed a New World of Tiny Living Things,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/sciencenature/early-microscopes-revealed-new-world-tiny-living-things-180958912/; see also
Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), BBC (2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/
historic_figures/van_leeuwenhoek_antonie.shtml (highlighting the life of the seventeenthcentury Dutch citizen who popularized the microscope despite having no formal scientific
education through descriptions of bacteria that he observed after making his own lenses to
examine fabrics in his drapery shop. The British Royal Society initially doubted his
discovery as previous lenses and microscopes could not view organisms as small as
bacteria).
70 See Measurement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Feb. 4 2020), https://www.
britannica.com/technology/measurement.
71 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 24.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Id. at 11.
64
65
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heavily influenced governments and governance. 74 Specifically, Scott argues
that the wild success of the Industrial Age inspired intellectuals in the
nineteenth and early-twentieth century to favor dramatically expanding the role
of the government. 75
In the mid-nineteenth century, intellectuals began aspiring to
administratively reorder nature and society. 76 Scott calls this mindset “high
modernism.” 77 “Modernism” refers to adherents’ wishes to emulate the success
of the ongoing Industrial Revolution. 78 To them, the Industrial Revolution
demonstrated the near limitless potential of scientific and technical expertise to
solve practical problems—including, they thought, all kinds of social
problems. 79 “High” refers to the lofty ambition of these intellectuals. 80 For
most of human history, the state’s goals were modest: extract taxes, repel
invaders, quell rebellion. 81 The concept that the state should seek to improve
the well-being of society was a novel one. 82 High-modernist plans were not
incremental or subtle; they disdained history and often they sought to wipe out
previous approaches and replace them with wholly re-engineered solutions. 83
High-modernist governments sought “the rational design of social order
commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws.” 84 Science
solved practical problems using information discovered through tools like the
microscope; high-modernist governments sought to solve governance problems
using information gathered through state tools of imposed legibility. 85
But Scott is careful to distinguish high modernism from scientific practice,
noting:
It was fundamentally, as the term ‘ideology’ implies, a faith that
borrowed, as it were, the legitimacy of science and technology. It
was, accordingly, uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically
optimistic about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of
human settlement and production. 86
This enthusiasm for a broad scope of government and confidence in the
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 354.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
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ability of experts to shape society was common to individuals and groups that
otherwise disagreed entirely on what society should look like. 87 It found its
most abhorrent and tragic expressions in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia,
but also undergirded more successful efforts such as Woodrow Wilson’s
expansion of federal administrative agencies in the US. 88
III. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HAS RAPIDLY INCREASED THE
SPEED AT WHICH THE WORLD IS BECOMING MORE LEGIBLE
Like the Industrial Age, we are in a new era of rapidly increasing legibility.
This is due primarily to information technology, which has increased the
legibility of the world in four ways. 89 Understanding these four ways matters
to governing technology, because each type of increased legibility raises
different policy concerns. 90
First, we conduct more of our interactions in the highly legible online
environment. 91 Cyberspace is perhaps the most comprehensive and heavily
used example of imposed legibility in human history. 92 The entire environment
was designed. It is an information environment where legibility is the point
(legibility to whom is an important question, however.). 93 Though the internet
has evolved over time, the core protocols remain highly legible. 94 The basic
protocols underlying the internet were built to relay information across servers
that are owned and used by many different organizations and people. 95 This
requires information to be observed—and not just by the party to whom it is
addressed.
How does online legibility compare to the offline world? The online world
is complex, but it remains much simpler than the offline world and thus
contains less total information. But unlike the offline world, nearly all
information online can be observed, collected, and analyzed relatively easily. 96
See id.
See id. at 5.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 4.
91 Paresh Dave, Zuckerberg Says Facebook’s Future is Going Big on Private Chats,
REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-zuckerberg/
zuckerberg-says-facebooks-future-is-going-big-on-private-chats-idUSKCN1QN2JR.
92 See Manuel Castells, The Impact of the Internet on Society: A Global Perspective,
MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/2014/09/08/171458/
the-impact-of-the-internet-on-society-a-global-perspective/.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 See Park, supra note 30, at 2 (describing the Internet as a complex system unique in
the fact that it is a “melting pot” and a “man-made many-body system.”).
96 See John Brownlee, Here’s What Websites Know About You, Just From the Way You
Browse, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3065894/heres87
88
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When you browse an online store, the computers hosting that website know in
detail how you interacted with the website. 97 Logging and analyzing those
interactions is a straightforward process. 98 Compare that to the local grocery
store, where such data could theoretically be gathered but is unavailable
without substantial additional effort. For these reasons, the online world has
achieved a level of legibility that surpasses any previous environment where
humans regularly interact. 99 As people do more of their daily transactions,
work, and entertainment in an online environment, the percentage of their daily
lives that becomes legible increases. 100
Although they may not use the word “legible,” countless others have
observed that more information is collectable in the online world than
offline. 101 Often this is framed as a problem to be fixed. But the internet, like
the microscope and other tools before it, offers access to more information.
Whether this additional information is a “problem” depends on how it is used.
The second way that technology increases legibility is through new sensor
technologies. 102 Technologies such as camera phones and internet connected
appliances are digitizing ever greater portions of the physical world, increasing
the legibility of our lives. 103 In 2017, Cisco estimated that people used nearly
five billion internet-connected devices to create links to machines in their cars,
workplaces, and homes. 104 Current projections estimate that the number will
grow as high as 30.9 billion internet-connected devices by 2025. 105 Federal,
state, and local governments are incorporating internet-connected devices to
conduct surveillance, monitor pollution levels, and guide the flow of traffic. 106
Internet-connected cameras have become particularly popular informationwhat-websites-know-about-you-just-from-the-way-you-browse.
97 Id.
98 See id.
99 See generally The Myth of Social Media, supra note 8, at 2–3 (outlining the gathered
statistics for how many users are active daily on different social media platforms).
100 E-Commerce Payment Trends: United States, J.P. MORGAN (2019),
https://www.jpmorgan.com/merchant-services/insights/reports/united-states.
101 Kihong Park, supra note 30, at 1.
102 The Sensor Based Economy, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/brandlab/2017/
01/sensor-based-economy/ (last visited May 5, 2021).
103 Id.
104 Cisco Annual Internet Report (2018–2023) White Paper, CISCO SYS. (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networkingindex-vni/white-paper-c11-741490.html#_Toc532256794.
105 Knud Lasse Lueth, State of the IoT 2020, IOT ANALYTICS, (Nov. 19, 2020) https://iotanalytics.com/state-of-the-iot-2020-12-billion-iot-connections-surpassing-non-iot-for-thefirst-time/.
106 Tam Harbert, Practical Uses of The Internet of Things in Government Are
Everywhere, GOV. TECH. (Jan. 2017), https://www.govtech.com/network/Practical-Uses-ofthe-Internet-of-Things-in-Government-Are-Everywhere.html.
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gathering tools for individuals, businesses, and governments. 107 These
increases in sensor deployment are making more of the previously offline
world digitally legible. 108
Third, legibility increases as communications technology enables nearinstantaneous sharing of information with people far beyond the reach of
physical communications. 109 Even if the total amount of legible data in the
world remained static, modern communications tools expand the number of
people to whom certain types of information are legible. 110 Such information
includes breaking international news, the publicly shared opinions of many
other persons, and personal communications in almost real-time. 111 We can
access in near-real time information about occurrences half the globe away. 112
Communications have greatly increased the amount of potential information
available to any connected individual. 113
Finally, increased computational power has helped turn raw signals into
useful information. 114 An increase in raw observable signals is not an increase
in legibility. 115 It depends on whether that data is useful for a particular
purpose. Turning signals into legible—and therefore useful—information
requires analysis. 116 Prior to the computer age, humans were the primary
repositories of analytical power. Now, we have silicon machines that can
perform sophisticated data analysis faster than humans can do addition, with
the power of these devices continuously increasing. 117 From 1956 to 2015,
computing power grew one-trillion-fold. 118 This computational power makes it
107 Trevor Timm, The Government Just Admitted It Will Use Home Devices for Spying,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 2016/feb/
09/internet-of-things-smart-devices-spying-surveillance-us-government.
108 The Sensor Based Economy, supra note 102.
109 John Boitnott, Tech Is Changing the Way We Get Our News, and It’s Not Stopping,
INC. (Jul. 22, 2015), https://www.inc.com/john-boitnott/tech-is-changing-the-way-we-getour-news-and-it-s-not-stopping.html.
110 STEPHEN D. REESE, JOURNALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 345
(Univ. of Texas 2010), https://journalism.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/journalismglobalization.pdf.
111 Id. at 347.
112 Id. at 350.
113 Castells, supra note 92.
114 William Silver, Image Processing: Turning Digital Data Into Useful Information,
PHOTONICS MARKETPLACE (last visited May 5, 2021), https://www.photonics.com/
Articles/Image_Processing_Turning_Digital_Data_into/a25135.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Alison DeNisco Rayome, MIT’s Automated Machine Learning Works 100x Faster
Than Human Data Scientists, TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/mits-automated-machine-learning-works-100x-fasterthan-human-data-scientists/.
118 Max Roser & Hannah Ritchie, Technological Progress, OUR WORLD IN DATA
https://ourworldindata.org/technological-progress (last visited May 5, 2021).
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possible to glean insights from large data sets. 119
Data analytic tools can help increase legibility like a microscope, by
identifying entirely new knowledge. 120 Big data analytics can make legible
unexpected connections within large data sets, extracting information
embedded in a system that no one could explicitly identify. 121 For example, the
FDA used a database of thousands of Kaiser Permanente patient profiles to
identify a heightened risk of heart attack in patients using Vioxx, an arthritis
drug. 122 Indeed, it appears that some of these analytical tools can make legible
certain types of mētis, Scott’s term for embedded knowledge that usually
cannot be made legible. 123
In other cases, algorithmic techniques appear capable of capturing mētis
even if it cannot make that knowledge legible. 124 Computer scientists have
crafted algorithms that learn tasks by doing: riding a bike, playing Go, etc. 125
One could describe certain types of deep learning as learning mētis –
knowledge that cannot be specified in rule sets but can only be learned through
repeated exposure to varying but similar situations. 126 Indeed, the familiar
tradeoff between the explainability and the accuracy of certain deep learning
algorithms is a tangible example of what might be lost when mētis is
discarded. 127
But while these analytic tools are powerful, one should not overstate their
capabilities. Data analysis and machine learning are not flawless or simple

119 Dave Muoio, With $7M Contract, NIH Taps Big Data Analysis Platform Palantir to
Streamline Health Research, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Sep. 24, 2018),
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/7m-contract-nih-taps-big-data-analysis-platformpalantir-streamline-health-research.
120 Ryan Ayers, The Small Business Owner’s Guide to Data Analytics, BUSINESS.COM
(last updated Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.business.com/articles/data-analysis-for-smallbusiness/.
121 George Zarkadakis, 5 Things AI Can Do Better Than Humans, HUFFPOST (last
updated Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/5-things-ai-can-dobetter_b_8906570.
122 Anna Wilde Mathews & Scott Hensley, Big HMO Reconsiders Vioxx After Study
Points to Heart Risks, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 26, 2004), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB109346588678101103.
123 Christopher M. Patrick, Democracy: Metis or Techne?, MESOPOTAMIAN MARINE
(April 1, 2013), https://mesopotamianmarine.wordpress.com/2013/04/01/democracy-metisor-techne-3/.
124 See generally Will Knight, This AI Algorithm Learns Simple Tasks as Fast as We Do,
MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/2015/12/10/164598/
this-ai-algorithm-learns-simple-tasks-as-fast-as-we-do/.
125 Id.
126 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 11.
127 Id.
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processes. 128 Such insights are not perfect, and sometimes not even useful.
Even the most powerful deep learning tools today operate more like animal
senses than like human cognition. 129 And there are many well-known
challenges, such as overfitting, underfitting, and unrepresentative source
data. 130 Sometimes, more data can increase the difficulty of generating
information or knowledge. 131 It can become difficult to separate signal from
noise. Data can be mistaken or unrepresentative. Humans also remain subject
to the same cognitive biases which large data sets can exacerbate. 132 For
example, we often identify coincidences as meaningful, and big data sets make
it easier to detect correlations that turn out to be coincidental. Despite these
challenges, computational tools can help generate knowledge and
understanding from gathered data, making good use out of the world’s
increased legibility. 133
These four trends mean that we have greater access to information about the
state of the world. We have access to that information without regard to
distance, and we can access it in a manner that is understandable and usable to
a wider number of people.
IV. INCREASED LEGIBILITY HAS TRIGGERED CONCERNS
This rapid increase in the legibility of the world has generated new
consumer and business fears. 134

128 James Vincent, These Are Three of the Biggest Problems Facing Today’s AI, VERGE
(Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/10/10/13224930/ai-deep-learninglimitations-drawbacks.
129 See Adnan Darwiche, Human-Level Intelligence or Animal-Like Abilities?, 61 COMM.
OF ACM (2018), https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3281635.3271625.
130 Greg Council, The Machine Learning Data Dilemma, UPSIDE (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://tdwi.org/articles/2019/04/15/adv-all-machine-learning-datadilemma.aspx#:~:text=Two%20common%20problems%20caused%20by%20poor%20data
%20curation%20are%20overfitting%20and%20bias.&text=Data
%20used%20for%20machine%20learning,require%20much%20more%20complex%20data.
131 Ari Zoldan, More Data, More Problems: Is Big Data Always Right?, WIRED (May
2013), https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/05/more-data-more-problems-is-big-dataalways-right/.
132 James Manyika et al., What Do We Do About the Biases in AI?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Dec. 25, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/what-do-we-do-about-the-biases-in-ai.
133 Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, Code-Dependent: Pros and Cons of the Algorithm
Age, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/02/08/codedependent-pros-and-cons-of-the-algorithm-age/.
134 Id. (noting that some participants of the study fear that algorithm use has a potential
for good, but companies may use it to gain an unfair advantage).
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A. People Fear They Are Losing Privacy
IT tools increase the legibility of the world, much like the microscope. 135
But to a greater proportion than the microscope, some of today’s tools of
increased legibility are used to study individuals, which concerns many
people. 136
Online interactions are by design and necessity highly legible, both
intentionally and out of necessity. 137 As noted above, more of people’s day-today activities occur online and therefore the legibility of those activities
increases—just compare the capturable data involved when shopping on
Amazon.com to shopping in your local CVS. Browsing the internet involves
interactions with other people’s online computers. These interactions are
generally viewable by the owners of those computers and others, even if the
consumer browses while sitting at home. For example, online advertising
technology makes the path one takes across the internet more legible in order
to deliver better targeted ads. 138
Furthermore, the rise of sophisticated sensors and computational techniques
means that our real-world interactions are also growing more legible. 139 Smart
sensors can detect when we arrive home or enter a retail store. 140 Facial
recognition technology potentially removes the relative anonymity of walking
down a busy city block or drinking in a busy bar. 141 We shout out questions to
home assistants, which use that information to improve the responses they give
us. 142
135 Rachel Coldicutt, Why Data Legibility is More Important than Explainability,
DOTEVERYONE (Oct. 15, 2018), https://medium.com/doteveryone/data-legibility-and-acommon-language-coping-not-coding-part-2-8afb687de60.
136 Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling
Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concernedconfused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/.
137 Christine Huang & Laura Silver, Social Media Users More Likely to Interact With
People Who Are Different From Them, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/08/22/social-media-users-more-likely-tointeract-with-people-who-are-different-from-them/.
138 Bennet Cyphers, A Guided Tour of the Data Facebook Uses to Target Ads, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/guided-tour-datafacebook-uses-target-ads.
139 Anderson & Rainie, supra note 133.
140 Ivan Moreno, How Floor Sensors Are Helping Retailers Track Shoppers’ Behavior,
DAILY HERALD (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.dailyherald.com/business/20180120/how-floorsensors-are-helping-retailers-track-shoppers-behavior.
141 Jelisa Castrodale, Tech Company Says Using Facial Recognition Technology in Bars
Isn’t Creepy at All, VICE (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en/article/9ke9yd/techcompany-says-using-facial-recognition-technology-in-bars-isnt-creepy-at-all.
142 Xavier Harding, Alphabet’s Latest Data Grab: Google Home Records Far More
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As a result of the increased legibility of our activities, some people are
concerned that they are losing privacy. 143 The term “privacy” is notoriously
flexible, but such concerns are generally rooted in a perceived or actual loss of
the ability to control others’ use of data about oneself. 144 As the amount of
legible information about individuals grows and becomes accessible to other
people, the more behavior becomes effectively public rather than effectively
private. 145
In the past, people were concerned about the privacy impacts of then-new
technologies that increased the legibility of human activity. 146 Sometimes this
concern generated new laws. 147 For example, the introduction of popular
portable cameras in the late 1800s made it possible to capture permanent
information about individuals in public places. 148 This new technology
prompted calls for new legal privacy protections in the United States. 149 In the
60s and 70s, concerns about new credit reporting services that used data about
individuals motivated Congress to pass federal legislation governing the use of
such information. 150 In other cases, society adapted without new legal
approaches. 151 For example, telephone caller ID features developed in the late
80s were initially criticized as privacy violations, but nowadays most people
consider the technology to actually protect privacy. 152

Sound Than Users Realize, Report Says, FORTUNE (July 11, 2019), https://fortune.com/
2019/ 07/11/google-home-listening-recording/.
143 Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—and How to
Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/whyprotecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/.
144 Auxier et al., supra note 136.
145 Anderson & Rainie, supra note 133.
146 Auxier et al., supra note 136.
147 See generally Cameron Kerry, Privacy and Cybersecurity Get Political Legs,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/02/25/privacyand-cybersecurity-get-political-legs/ (indicating the amount of new legislation in
cybersecurity in the 113th and 114th congress).
148 Mia Fineman, Kodak and the Rise of Amateur Photography, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM
OF ART (Oct. 2004), https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/kodk/hd_kodk.htm.
149 See Neil Chilson, When Considering Privacy Legislation, FEDERALIST SOC’Y,
https://regproject.org/paper/considering-federal-privacy-legislation/ (citing Louis Brandeis
& Samuel Warren, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890)).
150 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
151 See generally Mohana Ravindranath, Who’s in Charge of Regulating the Internet of
Things, NEXTGOV (Sept.1, 2016), https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2016/09/internetthings-regulating-charge/131208/ (explaining that legislation has not been created of the
difficult in interconnectivity of the “internet of things.”).
152 John Burgess, Privacy Issues Pervade Plans for ‘Caller ID’ Phone Service, WASH.
POST (Dec. 5, 1989), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1989/12/05/
privacy-issues-pervade-plans-for-caller-id-phone-service/5f90ad66-c389-406f-8e0ea756f59b8f12/.
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B. People Fear They Are Being Taken Advantage Of
Another concern often expressed about the increased legibility of the world
is that companies, or other people, will use information about someone else to
gain leverage over them. 153 This fear is prompted by the uneven distribution of
increased legibility—people worry that someone has compiled information
about them, but they do not know what information they possess, or how the
other party might use it. 154 For example, some people worry that companies
will learn the price tolerance of various individuals and will charge higher
prices for the same product to those who are willing to pay more. 155 People
also worry that companies will gather additional information and use it to
commercially manipulate others through advertising or other messages. 156
Often, this latter fear is not personalized: People frequently believe they will
not be fooled by such techniques but remain concerned that others will be. 157
C. People Fear Their Business Models Are Becoming Obsolete
Some people also worry that increased legibility of the world is making
certain business models obsolete. 158 Indeed, the growing legibility of the world
has the potential to disrupt many current lines of business. 159 It has already
significantly transformed the advertising industry and, with it, the business
models for content producers. 160 For example, witnesses to newsworthy events
can now share directly with interested audiences without news producers or
reporters. Real-time traffic applications reduce the need for helicopter news
153 New Poll Reveals 7 in 10 People Want Governments to Regulate Big Tech over
Personal Data Fears, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/
en/latest/news/2019/12/big-tech-privacy-poll-shows-people-worried/.
154 Auxier et al., supra note 136.
155 Phillip Longman, Big Tech is Watching Your Wallet, WASH. MONTHLY (April 2019),
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/april-may-june-2019/big-tech-is-spying-on-yourwallet/.
156 E.g., Arunesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K
Shopping Websites, 3 ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER-SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK &
SOCIAL COMPUTING 81, 85 (2019).
157 Michael Barthel et al., Many Americans Believe Fake News Is Sowing Confusion,
PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americansbelieve-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/.
158 Gordon Hui, How the Internet of Things Changes Business Models, HARVARD BUS.
REV. (July 29, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/how-the-internet-of-things-changes-businessmodels.
159 Id.
160 The Media Industry: In the Vanguard of Digital Transformation, WORLD ECON. F.,
http://reports.weforum.org/digital-transformation/the-media-industry-in-the-vanguard-ofdigital-transformation/ (last visited May 5, 2021).
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radio reports. 161 Retail security systems that track unpurchased merchandise
leaving the store reduce the need for security guards. 162
Being disrupted by a new technology is a common and reasonable concern,
from the point of view of the incumbent business owner. Technology-driven
productivity gains often threaten established business models. Incumbents with
deep investments into the status quo will understandably be reluctant to give
up their position, even if there are clear overall benefits to society. 163
D. People Fear Others Are Being Misinformed
The above-described concerns are fears about the increased legibility of the
world—the ability to more accurately assess the state of the world. 164
However, some fear that people are misusing communications to propagate
less accurate or downright deceptive information. 165 The increase of this fear
is, in part at least, due to increased legibility. 166
The same modern ability of an individual to speak to millions of others can
be used to spread both false and true information. 167 The declining power of
gatekeeper entities who used to vet stories before mass distribution means that
false stories can draw attention or website traffic and quickly propagate. 168
There is evidence that well-resourced entities with malicious intentions have
used internet platforms to spread propaganda. 169 And more traditional media
161 Olivia Allen-Price, From Aviators to Apps: The Evolution of Traffic Data, KQED (Jan.
17, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11718629/from-aviators-to-apps-the-evolution-oftraffic-data.
162 Raymund Flandez, Stop That Thief, WALL STREET J. (June 12, 2008),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121322091260765769.
163 See Rick Newman, 10 Great Companies that Lost Their Edge, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 19,
2010), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2010/08/19/10-great-companiesthat-lost-their-edge.
164 See id.
165 Dannagal G. Young & Shannon McGregor, Mass Propaganda Used to Be Difficult,
But Facebook Made It Easy, WASH. POST, (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/02/14/mass-propaganda-used-be-difficultfacebook-made-it-easy/.
166 Id.
167 Sara Brown, MIT Sloan Research About Social Media, Misinformation, and
Elections, MIT SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT. (Oct. 5, 2020), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-madeto-matter/mit-sloan-research-about-social-media-misinformation-and-elections.
168 Of course, the old gatekeeper model was no guarantee of truthful reporting. Mediadriven scares, such as the panic over satanic cults in the 80s, demonstrate that
misinformation can and has spread through traditional media. See JESSE WALKER, THE
UNITED STATES OF PARANOIA (HarperCollins 2013). Indeed, there is evidence that
traditional media has been a major contributor to the spread of misinformation in some
cases. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION,
DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Oxford Univ. Press 2018).
169 See YOCHAI BENKLER, ET AL., supra note 168, at 6, 38 (noting that experts identified a
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have amplified such efforts. 170
As a result, there is almost certainly more misinformation available to
individuals than there was twenty or forty years ago. 171 However, the store of
available truthful information available has also increased significantly. 172
Thus, it is not clear whether the ratio of good to bad information has changed
over that time; it is certainly easier than ever to research the correct answer
than at any time in the past. 173
If it is easier than ever to find correct information, why is the fear of
misinformation growing? One reason is a direct result of increased
legibility. 174 Misinformation created or spread by others is now more visible
than ever. 175 People have always spread rumors, misinformation, and
falsehoods, but never have such statements been as permanently available to a
worldwide audience. Rantings of a street corner flat-earth conspiracy theorist
reach a small audience and disappear, forgotten. Online, however, such
rantings become semi-permanent evidence of misinformation, so the increase
in legibility of misinformation might suggest it is increasing. 176 Furthermore,
when faced with evidence that a large group of people believe something
preposterous or distasteful, it can be difficult to accept that those people have
independently reached a different conclusion. It may be easier to believe that
such people are less autonomous than us and are being manipulated. 177

set of actors as “prime suspects in causing the present state of information disorder,” and
later noting, “we are operating in a propaganda-rich environment and . . . network
propaganda is a much deeper threat to democracy than any out-of-human-control sociotechnical process.”).
170 See generally id.
171 See id. at 37–38 (noting the widespread presence of misinformation in modern media,
but also noting that its effect is likely less influential than outright propaganda).
172 See id. at 386.
173 See id. at 386 (“[these] observations suggest that professional journalism continues to
play a critical role in anchoring public debate in facts and evidence-based norms and that it
functions within a vibrant network of nontraditional sites that constitute a more
decentralized, participatory networked public sphere that can work around and through its
interactions with the mainstream to diversify expression, counter some of the failure modes
of the mainstream, and make mobilization more democratic.”).
174 See Filippo Menczer & Thomas Hills, Information Overload Helps Fake News
Spread and Social Media Knows It, SCI. AM., DIV. OF SPRINGER NATURE AM., INC. (Dec. 1,
2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/information-overload-helps-fake-newsspread-and-social-media-knows-it/.
175 See id.
176 See Brown, supra note 167.
177 See Menczer & Hills, supra note 174.
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V. LESSONS FROM SEEING LIKE A STATE
In seeking to take advantage of the opportunities raised by increased
legibility, while addressing the related concerns, companies and policymakers
can learn from Scott’s description of the effects of discovered and imposed
legibility generated during the Industrial Age. 178
SLAS distills four characteristics common to failed government efforts to
change complex systems. 179 First, government uses simplifying tools to
increase the legibility of the system to a central authority. 180 Second,
government embraces a high-modernism mindset with ambitious, overly
confident, and comprehensive plans for redesigning the system. 181 Third,
government possesses enough authority and power to mandate adoption of
these plans. 182 Finally, civil society is too weak to overtly resist the imposition
of the plans. 183
Scott describes the results of interventions that share these four
characteristics:
At best, the new order was fragile and vulnerable, sustained by
improvisations not foreseen by its originators. At worst, it wreaked
untold damage in shattered lives, damaged ecosystems, and
fractured or impoverished societies. 184
To avoid these consequences, Scott argues for “institutions that are instead
multifunctional, plastic, diverse, and adaptable—in other words, institutions
that are powerfully shaped by mētis.” 185 His four characteristics of failed
interventions suggest four corresponding lessons for developing “mētis friendly institutions,” as he calls them:
1. Minimize simplistic legibility
2. Temper ambitious plans with prudence and humility
3. Reduce the planner’s ability to impose a plan
4. Increase the ability of participants to resist or shape such
plans. 186
I will elaborate on each of these strategies. I have tried to keep the
discussion generic enough to apply to company decisions as well as the
government decisions addressed by Scott. Each lesson can be applied
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

See generally SCOTT, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 356.
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separately or in combination. Although Scott mostly discusses government
institutions, he argues for the importance of incorporating mētis in any
institution where “the quality of the institution and its product depends on
engaging the enthusiastic participation of its people.” 187 That description
certainly applies to online platforms, as do these lessons. 188
A. Minimize Simplistic Legibility
As discussed earlier, when a state seeks to understand a complex system in
order to control it, the state increases legibility of that system by reducing
complexity. 189 It does so by replacing or discarding knowledge not relevant to
its purpose. 190 Imposing legibility in pursuit of one purpose can change the
system, undermining other purposes the system may have also served. 191 The
old business adage that “you get what you measure” applies here. Such
simplistic, reductive legibility efforts abandon information and can damage the
system. 192
There are two ways to minimize simplistic legibility. The most
straightforward would be to avoid imposing legibility in the first place. 193 But
businesses and government need information for certain purposes. They need
insight into the system they seek to govern. Without such information, their
efforts will have less effect in achieving their goal and possibly do more harm
to the governed system. 194
Still, in some circumstances, the benefits of limiting legibility could
outweigh the costs. In the physical world, where imposed legibility replaces a
local tradition or knowledge, withdrawing imposed legibility could enable
people to re-establish their local knowledge and mētis. 195 One might
reasonably decide that the benefits from this would be worth forgoing or
limiting a specific purpose. For example, a central government might decline
to adopt a single official language despite the decrease in legibility.
But in the digital context, the network protocols—the physics of cyberspace
—must be chosen by someone. In this designed environment, defaulting to the

Id. at 353.
See id. (explaining how incorporating mētis is important in all institutions).
189 Id. at 2.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 22–23.
192 See id. at 3 (recognizing that in promoting legibility states do not consider all
information, rather only pieces of particular interest).
193 See id. at 2 (acknowledging briefly the downside of state-imposed legibility).
194 See id. (describing how a lack of knowledge on subjects hinders the entity’s abilities).
195 Id. at 24.
187
188
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highest possible level of legibility makes sense. After all, building fundamental
limits to information in the foundation of a general-purpose system would be
like changing the physics of light in order to prevent peeping toms. It would
permanently foreclose some types of inquiry without knowing what tradeoffs
that might impose. Instead, it is better to make the lowest level of the system as
legible as possible, and then build protocols on top of it to protect information.
Don’t change the physics of light—instead, install a privacy fence.
The second way to limit simplistic legibility is to avoid oversimplifying as
much as possible. 196 This is difficult. In all cases, imposing legibility affects
information that could be useful for other purposes. In the worst cases,
including many of those documented by Scott, the imposed legibility destroys
information necessary to carry out the state’s intended purpose. 197
But while it is not possible to completely avoid simplification, different
methods of imposing legibility differ in how and what they simplify. 198 Being
conscious of the collateral effects of the methods can help the authority choose
the least reductive model. 199 New data analysis tools may help because they
can be used on complex, non-heterogenous data. Rather than squeeze needed
information into a governance-friendly format, analytical tools may make it
possible to collect the information in the more complex form yet still derive
useful knowledge from it. 200
B. Temper Ambitious Plans with Prudence and Humility
The second lesson is to avoid the high-modernist mindset. 201 This does not
necessarily mean abandoning lofty goals, but it does mean pursuing them with

See id. at 11 (acknowledging the results of oversimplification).
Id. at 22–23.
198 Id. at 353–54.
199 Id. at 354.
200 Some see these powerful tools combined with the increased legibility of the world as
an opportunity to replace capitalism’s decentralized market economy with more centralized
mechanisms to distribute goods and services. See generally Viktor Mayer-Schönberger &
Thomas Ramge, 15 REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 163 (London: Basic
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beyond the scope of this paper, but a preliminary critique is that this misunderstands the
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a plan that reflects some degree of humility, respect for the existing knowledge
in the system, and a realistic assessment of what might go wrong. 202 Scott
recommends two concrete methods to avoid high modernism. 203 First, he
suggests planners take incremental steps toward their goal and allow plenty of
opportunities to receive feedback and adjust. 204 Second, he encourages
approaches that can be reversed without too much disturbance if things go
badly. 205 Both recommendations help accommodate inevitable surprises and
unanticipated reactions and adjustments by participants. 206
For example, in dealing with misinformation, rather than adopting a
comprehensive initial plan that attempts to cover all categories of potential
misinformation, platforms could identify one narrow category of
misinformation to focus on. They could test several different techniques on
identifying this type of content and how to deal with it (by removal or
flagging?). This would allow them to learn from user feedback and any
adaptations by generators of such misinformation, and then apply those lessons
to broader categories of misinformation.
C. Reduce the Planner’s Ability to Impose a Plan
Another lesson is to limit the ability of the planner to impose a plan. 207 If the
planner cannot force adoption of a plan, it will need to persuade people—a
process that requires compromise and emergent decision making, and therefore
incorporates a far wider range of input and knowledge. 208
The US government has existing limits on its ability to impose central plans:
constitutional rights for individuals, separation of powers, and federalism, to
name a few. 209 Some of these limits have eroded over time, but they remain
fundamentally sound. Other nations have far fewer or no such limits. 210 While
it may be desirable to strengthen such limits, this is not a practical approach for
our purposes and in any case is outside of the scope of this paper.
Id. at 4, 6.
Id. at 6.
204 Id. at 4–5.
205 Id.
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208 Id. at 6.
209 U.S. CONST. pmbl.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
210 Teresa Cheng, Why Separation of Powers Has No place in Hong Kong’s Political
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But how might a large platform apply this lesson? Platforms do face
constraints on their authority, as mentioned earlier; for example, market
pressures, local law, and investor interests. 211 One way to further limit a
platform’s ability to impose a central plan would be to strengthen any of these
constraints. For example, local laws could be changed to limit platforms’
abilities. Of course, such laws themselves have all the weaknesses of
centralized decision-making and should be evaluated accordingly.
Still, platforms could themselves take additional measures to limit their
ability to impose certain plans. For example, platforms could push decision
making out to independent organizations or standards bodies. 212 They could
make legally binding promises about how they will use or change the platform.
Yet another approach is to make certain types of control technically infeasible.
For example, Mark Zuckerberg has recently announced that Facebook is
shifting toward an encrypted private chatroom business model. 213 Such a selfimposed reduction of legibility would limit Facebook’s ability to review or
moderate certain content.
D. Increase the Ability of the Participants to Resist or Shape Such Plans
Finally, governments and companies could improve the ability of
individuals and the system to resist and/or to shape plans. Scott specifically
encourages the establishment of mētis-friendly systems that enhance users and
incorporate their values. 214 He argues that one can test for mētis-friendly
systems by asking “to what degree does it promise to enhance the skills,
knowledge, and responsibility of those who are a part of it?” and “how deeply
[the institution] is marked by the values and experience of those who compose
it.” 215
Usefully incorporating user input for large populations usually requires
decentralized approaches where a company (or government) does not control
content. 216 The paradigmatic example of such a system is the complex market
forces that channel consumer demands into producer incentives. 217 Such
solutions can scale readily with the addition of more users. 218 They can apply a
211 Devin Coldewey, Who Regulates Social Media?, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/19/who-regulates-social-media/.
212 Issie Lapowsky, How Facebook’s Oversight Board Could Rewrite the Rules of the
Entire Internet, PROTOCOL (May 6, 2020), https://www.protocol.com/facebook-oversightboard-rules-of-the-internet.
213 Dave, supra note 91.
214 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 353.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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user’s knowledge and values directly to the problem they are facing. 219
Additionally, they are flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances or
user needs. 220
To embrace this lesson, platforms could create tools that empower various
users or groups of users to help govern themselves and their communities.
Such tools could include consumer review and ratings systems, deputizing
users, creating more broadly accessible moderator tools, and incentivizing
beneficial user behavior. Platforms like Wikipedia and Reddit already use such
tools and benefit from the social norms that have developed around them. 221
These tools enable the platform to incorporate user knowledge and mētis and
evolve as users change. 222
VI. EXAMPLE APPLICATION: PRIVACY – RULES OR STANDARDS?
Many policy problems—including the four legibility-generated fears
discussed earlier—could benefit from applying the SLAS lessons. While I
provide a few examples of how the four lessons might be employed by
platforms and regulators, it is worth digging into another example to consider
how those strategies might be applied.
As discussed earlier, much of the concern around privacy comes from
individuals misperceiving how legible their behaviors are. People, institutions,
and companies are still adapting to increased legibility. 223 As society adapts,
there are a wide number of tools available. These include shifting social norms,
technological changes, private agreements, soft law, enforcement of common
law or general consumer protection laws, and new legislation. 224 The SLAS
lessons discussed above provide one way to evaluate and compare the forms of
these tools in general, or to compare specific proposals of how to use these
tools.
In order to demonstrate the SLAS criteria, however, I will limit myself to
comparing the two different federal privacy approaches in the US: the rulebased regulatory approach 225 and the case-by-case enforcement of general
standards approach. 226 Contrary to common perception, the US does have
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federal privacy protections, and they take these two forms. The US regulates
the practices of specific industries, such as financial, credit, and health. 227 In
these sectors companies must follow detailed ex ante rules established by
Congress and/or regulators—the rules-based approach. 228 For other sectors,
the Federal Trade Commission brings ex post enforcement actions under its
consumer protection authority when it believes companies’ uses of consumer
data have been unfair or deceptive—the standards approach. 229
Outside of the privacy context, lawyers, economists, and philosophers have
long debated rules versus standards. 230 There are many benefits and detriments
to each. This example is not intended to rehash that entire, useful debate. My
purpose is to evaluate these two approaches to privacy considering the lessons
from SLAS.
Case-by-case enforcement of standards minimizes simplistic legibility.
Even ignoring the content of the rules and standards being compared, rules
by their nature impose more legibility than do standards. Rulemaking is
characterized in part by imposing legibility on the governed practices and
entities. 231 For example, privacy statutes, whether sector specific like the
Health Information Privacy Protection Act or economy-wide like Europe’s
General Data Protection Regulation, define many characteristics of information
and business practices. 232 Is data sensitive or non-sensitive? Personally
identifiable or anonymized? Health data? What is a data processor as compared
to a data controller? Stakeholders fiercely debate such regulatory definitions
because those definitions create simplified, legally significant categories that
will apply to future types of information. 233 Creating definitions that apply in
944 (2020).
227 Margo H. K. Tank et al., Fintech Regulation in the USA, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bf6638f5-b77c-457f-a0c7-aaf7e0483467.
228 Id.
229 Privacy and Security Enforcement, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement (last visited May 5,
2021).
230 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.
J. 557–629 (1992).
231 Lawrence E. Ritchie et al., OSC Burden Reduction Initiative – Rules-Based Versus
Principle-Based Regulation, OSLER (June 25, 2019), https://www.osler.com /en/blogs/risk/
june-2019/osc-burden-reduction-initiative-rules-based-versus-principle-based regulation.
232 Nigel Jones, HIPAA and the GDPR: Understanding the Relationship, PRIV.
COMPLIANCE HUB, https://www.privacycompliancehub.com/gdpr-resources/hipaa-and-thegdpr-understanding-the-relationship/ (last visited June 21, 2021).
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Privacy Policy, BRIDGE (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/
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multiple situations requires distilling what is common to such scenarios and
discarding the unique context of each situation. The broader the applicability
of the definition, the more total context must be discarded to form a workable
definition. That is why, for example, it is easier to define “sensitive” or
personal information in a sector-specific privacy law (like financial services)
than it is to define that same term for all sectors.
Compare the legibility imposed in rulemaking with ex post enforcement of
privacy under general principles like “unfairness” and “deception.” 234 Those
terms are not defined ahead of time. Instead, those concepts are developed over
time through application of judgment to different sets of facts. Regarding
privacy, those concepts are further fleshed out by Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) “soft law” in guidance and reports. 235 Many of the same terms defined
in privacy legislation are described in such guidance. For example, the FTC
discusses what is sensitive personal information in reports, consumer and
business education, and in case complaints. 236 However, the FTC’s
descriptions are inductive and common-law like, looking back to past specific
cases to provide guidance for future decision-making. 237 For example, in any
specific case the FTC may need to determine whether certain information is
sensitive or not. Such categorization arguably imposes legibility on the facts of
that case. The effects of assembling a definition over dozens or hundreds of
cases is more like the microscope—a process of discovering legibility rather
than imposing it. 238
Such standards are often less legible to companies than rules. Indeed,
companies often complain that the FTC’s privacy and data security
requirements are not clear, for example. This is one of the downsides of
standards, and indeed, a direct consequence of avoiding simplistic categories.
Case-by-case enforcement reflects more prudence and humility than
“comprehensive” privacy legislation.
Case-by-case enforcement avoids high modernism better than rule-based
234 Allen H. Denson & Latif Zaman, States’ Divergent Approaches to Unfair, Deceptive,
and Abusive Acts and Practices Reveal Consumer Protection Priorities, ABA (Aug. 22,
2019) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2019/09/abusiveacts/.
235 Hard Law/Soft Law, ECCHR, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/hard-law-soft-law/
(last visited May 5, 2021).
236 Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, FTC (Oct. 2016)
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/protecting-personal-informationguide-business.
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approaches. 239 It better embraces Scott’s two suggestions. It is incremental, in
that the standards evolve slowly as new cases are considered. 240 And while
each case forms precedent for future cases, if the revised principle is not a
good fit in future cases, it can be modified or reversed without too much
disruption.
Compare that with what is often called “comprehensive” privacy
legislation. 241 As the descriptor indicates, such plans are often broad in scope,
setting detailed rules for every industry and business model. 242 They are
typically discontinuous rather than incremental – the laws come entirely into
effect upon the effective date. 243 Additionally, they are difficult to revise or
reverse, with amendments taking on the same order of time as the original
laws. 244
Of course, some legislation and rules are crafted more prudently than others.
Even if case-by-case approaches are off the table, legislators or regulators can
still seek to follow this lesson in several ways. All else being equal, many
prefer sector-specific legislation to generally applicable legislation. 245
Legislation can also adopt general principles, such as fiduciary-like duties or
the FTC’s own organic “unfairness and deception” statute, which will be
fleshed out through agency enforcement. 246 Similarly, delegating rulemaking
authority to an agency can minimize the need for congress to predict future
developments—although the agency then faces a similar challenge.
Case-by-case enforcement reduces the planner’s ability to impose broad
privacy rules.
By its very nature, case-by-case enforcement is not conducive to imposing a
plan. 247 Enforcement usually deals with one or a small number of individuals
Chilson, supra note 226.
See generally SCOTT, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining that “certain forms of knowledge
and control require a narrowing of vision.”).
241 Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
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(last visited May 5, 2021).
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dictionary/applicable-law-or-applicable-laws (last visited May 5, 2021).
246 15 U.S.C. § 45; see also FTC Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm’n. Act, § 5 (2016).
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Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. Rev. 583, 583–86 (2014) (arguing that because most FTC privacy
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or firms at a time. 248 It typically involves a limited set of specific actions by
those parties. 249 The injunctive remedies imposed can be detailed and lengthy
(FTC settlements are typically for 20 years, for example), but they usually only
apply to the defendant. 250 It may be possible to implement a complex plan
involving many parties using the tools of case-by-case enforcement: a Boston
federal district judge managed the desegregation of Boston public schools in
the 70s and into 80s, for example. 251 But its rarity speaks to its difficulty.
One of few areas of broad agreement in the privacy debate is that the FTC’s
case-by-case enforcement approach limits its ability to impose across the board
privacy rules. 252 Many people argue that new privacy legislation ought to
remedy this by delegating substantial and broad rulemaking authority to the
FTC. 253 Others oppose broad rulemaking authority, believing that the current
case-by-case approach is preferable or arguing that Congress should establish
federal privacy regulations. 254 So, while people disagree on whether it is a
good thing, most everyone would agree that the current general privacy
approach in the US limits the FTC’s ability to impose plans, following this
lesson from SLAS. 255

law cases result in settlements, there is not a comprehensive body of case law for scholars to
analyze and interpret as substantive privacy jurisprudence).
248 See id. at 588 (explaining FTC’s power to bring an action against an individual
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Participants can challenge case-by-case enforcement of privacy standards
more easily than a comprehensive privacy law or regulations.
At least for some participants, case-by-case enforcement is easier to
challenge than legislation or rulemaking, although neither method is easy.
Enforcement actions provide each defendant with an opportunity to challenge
the action in court and with due process protections. 256 No matter the standard
in place, the accused violator has a chance to persuade a neutral decisionmaker
that the standard is wrong or that it does not fit the facts of his situation. 257
Quite frankly, neither the standards-based approach nor the rules-based
approach get us very far toward Scott’s recommendation that systems find
ways to deeply incorporate the knowledge and values of participants. 258
Neither approach is particularly inclusive. The participants who can share
knowledge and values in a case-by-case approach are primarily the accused
violators. 259 There are many other participants in a privacy enforcement
system, including the customers or users of the accused business. Their views
may not be well represented in court. Even worse are rules-based approaches,
which cannot incorporate all local context present at the adoption of the rules,
let alone future contexts where the rules will apply. 260
Even represented participants face an uphill battle in fighting an
enforcement action. For this reason, most defendants in FTC privacy
enforcement actions settle with the Commission. 261 Challenging a statutory or
regulatory rule is, as a general matter, even more difficult, requiring a
constitutional challenge or overcoming Chevron deference to an agency’s
decisions. 262
This lesson, thus, suggests a slight preference for case-by-case approaches to
privacy over rulemaking approaches. But this lesson has more consequential
implications for the types of consumer-facing privacy practices that companies
ought to employ. That analysis is outside the scope of this example.
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(1984).

62

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 29.2

VII. CONCLUSION
Our world grows ever more legible to human and digital observation. This
promises humans an ever-greater ability to shape the world to meet their needs.
It also raises concerns about how humans might seek to shape each other.
Scott’s work contains deep insights about the use of and limits to legibility in
pursuit of reshaping human societies. 263 As government regulators and tech
platform leaders seek to address concerns raised by an ever more legible world,
they should heed those insights. I have highlighted four lessons for anyone
who would intervene in complex systems: minimize simplistic legibility;
temper ambitious plans with prudence and humility; reduce the planner’s
ability to impose a plan; and increase the ability of participants to resist or
shape such plans. 264 Those four lessons have broad application to today’s
technology policy questions. But Seeing Like A State also contains additional
riches about legibility and governance that I hope academics, policy makers,
and business leaders will continue to mine in our ever more legible world. 265

263 See SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2 (arguing that legibility is a central problem in
statecraft).
264 See generally id. (noting that plans with aims of simplistic legibility often produce the
opposite result).
265 See generally id. at 2, 5, 11 (noting examples of how legibility goals are implemented
across society and how it can be detrimental to statecraft).

